Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyse the cross-countries determinants of nonperforming loans (NPLs), the potential impact of supervisory devices, and institutional environment on credit risk exposure. Design/methodology/approach -The paper employs aggregate banking, financial, economic, and legal environment data for a panel of 59 countries over the period [2002][2003][2004][2005][2006]. It develops a comprehensive model to explain differences in the level of NPLs between countries. To assess the role of regulatory supervision on credit risk, the paper uses several interactions between institutional features and regulatory devices. Findings -The empirical results indicate that higher capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and prudent provisioning policy seems to reduce the level of problem loans. The paper also reports a desirable impact of private ownership, foreign participation, and bank concentration. However, the findings do not support the view that market discipline leads to better economic outcomes. All regulatory devices do not significantly reduce problem loans for countries with weak institutions, corrupt environment, and little democracy. Finally, the paper shows that the effective way to reduce bad loans is through strengthening the legal system and increasing transparency and democracy, rather than focusing on regulatory and supervisory issues. Practical implications -First, higher CARs results in less credit exposures. Second, international regulators should continue their efforts to enhance financial development. The results suggest that foreign participation plays an important role in reducing credit exposure of financial institutions. However, in developed countries, foreign entry led to more problem loans. Finally, to reduce credit risk exposure in countries with weak institutions, the effective way to do it is through enhancing the legal system, strengthening institutions, and increasing transparency and democracy. Originality/value -The paper contributes to the literature on banking regulation and supervision. It examines aggregated data which best reflect the level of NPL of the banks in a country as opposed to individual data included in databases that suffer from the problem of representativeness. It considers the impact of regulatory variables after controlling for bank industry factors that alter primarily problem loans. Finally, the paper examines the effectiveness of regulation through the inclusion of institutional factors.
Introduction
After a relatively calm decade, the international banking industry suffered during the last three years an unprecedented meltdown. Several banks throughout the world, including in developed and developing countries, experienced severe losses on their credit portfolios leading to banks failures and to a global fear of a systemic crisis. This crisis raised further concerns about financial systems stability and the need for a closer control and supervision on lending activities and institutions. In particular, international regulators (IMF, World Bank, and the BIS) engaged, over the last decade, several reforms, and programs aiming to strengthen banking and financial systems in different countries. Various assessments are periodically made to timely predict any undesirable exposure. Specifically, the aggregate rate of nonperforming loans (NPLs) is commonly used as a soundness indicator.
Despite ongoing efforts to control bank lending activities, NPLs are still a major concern for both international and local regulators. According to the IMF (2007) , the aggregate rate of NPLs exhibits large disparities in a cross-country basis, particularly between developed and developing countries. While some countries suffer severely from bad loans, such as Egypt, Nigeria, Philippines, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia (more than 15 percent), other countries do not seem to be exposed to deteriorated assets quality, such as Sweden, Norway, Finland, Australia, and Spain (less than 1 percent). Besides, over the last several years, a significant strand of research stressed out the central role of assets quality as a predictor of bank failures (Demirguc-Kunt, 1989; Whalen, 1991; Barr and Siems, 1994; Berger and DeYoung, 1997) .
Two strands of research have attempted to explain these disparities. In the first strand, NPLs are explained either by bank specific or by macroeconomic factors. Problem loans are often used as an exogenous variable to explain other banking outcomes such as bank performance, failures, and bank crisis. However, a limited number of studies investigate problem loans as an endogenous variable (Sinkey and Greenawalt, 1991; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Salas and Saurina, 2002) . Recently, the interest on the determinants of NPLs has been reconsidered by various authors, as data on problem loans became available. For instance, Breuer (2006) , using Bankscope data, analyses the impact of legal, political, sociological, economic, and banking institutions on problem bank loans. Nevertheless, her study suffers from a representativeness bias due to the fact that Bankscope data on NPLs are only available for a very limited number of countries and for a few numbers of banks. Babihuga (2007) , in an IMF working paper, explores the relationship between several macroeconomic variables and financial soundness indicators (capital adequacy, profitability, and asset quality) based on country aggregate data. She explained the cross-country heterogeneity by differences in interest rates, inflation, and other macroeconomic factors. However, the study does not consider the impact of industry specific drivers of problem loans.
A second growing strand of research, pioneered by Barth et al. (2004) , investigates the impact of banking regulation and supervision factors on various banking outcomes, such as NPLs. The seminal works of Barth et al. (2004 Barth et al. ( , 2006 highlighted the superiority of the private interest view over the public interest view in governing banking systems. According to the authors, market imperfections are preferred to political imperfections in regard to economic and financial outcomes. The debate over which of the two points of view is preferred is yet unresolved. Some continue to argue that empowering government regulation is the unique mean to overcome undesirable market imperfections. Others, stress out that powerful governments and control agencies are associated with inefficient economic outcomes.
The aim of this study is first to investigate the impact of bank industry factors on the aggregate rate of NPLs. Based on an extensive literature review, we propose a model relating NPLs to banking industry features. Particularly, it serves to capture differences between banking systems in terms of capitalization, provisions policy, profitability and ownership structure, and industry concentration. Second, the study examines the impact of the regulatory environment on reducing problem loans.
Banking supervision and NPLs
This is captured through public and private supervision, independence of supervision authorities and the level of regulatory capital requirements. Finally, it addresses the issue of the impact of the legal and political environment of the effectiveness of supervisory regulations. Our study contributes to the literature on problem loans in several ways. First, we use aggregated data which best reflect the level of NPLs of the banks in the country level. Previous research used individual data provided by Bankscope which suffer from the problem of representativeness. Second, we examine a period of time when the IMF was conducting several financial systems assessment programs and when local regulators started to be aware of the necessary reduction of problem loans. We therefore expect information disclosure on credit exposure to be more accurate and to better reflect the soundness (or not) of financial systems.
Our study also contributes to the literature on how supervisory effectiveness impacts accumulated problem loans. To the best of our knowledge, no research has analyzed the impact of regulatory variables after controlling for bank industry factors that primarily alter problem loans. Specifically, the work by Barth et al. (2004 Barth et al. ( , 2006 do not control for non regulatory determinants of problem loans among other banking outcomes. We also control the differences in the political and the legal environment between countries to assess the extent to which effectiveness of supervisory regulation leads to a well-functioning financial system, as suggested by a number of authors (Barth et al., 2006; Kaufmann et al., 2008) .
Using data from a sample of 59 countries for which bank industry and regulatory information are available, the empirical results show that a high level of capitalization, a prudent provisioning policy, the concentration of the banking industry, and the presence of foreign capital are the main factors that reduce the level of NPLs. However, we find that state participation in banks increases problem loans. Regarding banking surveillance, the results indicate that bank regulatory, and supervisory variables do not systematically affect the level of NPLs. It is only in a healthy legal and democratic environment that official supervision and regulation contribute to promote a sound and stable financial system. Along these lines, it would be necessary to encourage information disclosure, transparency and sharing alongside with implementing supervisory devices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on bank industry and regulatory determinants of NPLs. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology. Sections 4 and 5, respectively, present and discuss the empirical results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Bank industry factors, supervision and NPLs: literature review and hypothesis development 2.1 Bank industry factors of NPLs The empirical literature on NPLs explains banks problem loans using bank specific or internal variables. These bank-specific factors are related to bank management and firm-level features which include proxies of bank capitalization, provisioning policy, profitability, ownership status, and industry concentration.
2.1.1 Bank capitalization. Theoretically, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) might serve as a tool to control excessive risk taking by banks and to prevent them from being insolvent through recapitalization (Basel accord). Banks with CAR less than the regulatory minimum are forced to adjust their balance sheet to comply with the regulatory requirements either by raising more capital (holding assets constant) or reducing risk-weighted assets (holding capital constant). In fact, raising the level of capital relative to risky assets by either means could have a beneficial impact on the bank performance and soundness (Fries et al., 2002) . Indeed, Koehn and Santomero (1980) show theoretically that the portfolio risk increases with the increase of the minimum capital ratio. They state that banks under pressure to increase capital will reach the desired level by increasing the risk of assets.
Empirically, there is no consensus on the relation between capital adequacy and NPLs. On one hand, Sinkey and Greenawalt (1991) show that banks with adequate capital ratio experience lower rates of NPLs. On the other hand, banks with high levels of CARs might be encouraged to embark in riskier activities leading to riskier credit portfolios. Rime (2001) corroborates this argument. He observed a positive relationship between bank risk and capital ratio for a panel of Swiss banks during the period 1989-1995:
H1. Capital adequacy ratio is negatively associated with NPLs.
Provisioning policy.
Loan loss provisions are regarded as a controlling mechanism over expected loan losses. Under backward-looking provisioning practices, where provisions are triggered by default incidents on loans, higher levels of NPLs are associated with high rates of pro-visioning (Hasan and Wall, 2004) . At the same time, banks anticipating high levels of capital losses might create higher provisions to decrease earnings volatility and to reinforce medium term bank solvency. In this case, managers can also use loan loss provisions to signal the financial strength of their banks. The willingness of a bank to provision for loan losses is regarded as a strong belief in the future performance of the bank (Ahmad et al., 1999) . The overall rate of provisioning reflects the general attitude of the banking system toward risk control:
H2. Loan loss provisions are positively associated with NPLs.
2.1.3 Bank profitability. Bank profitability may also determine the risk taking behaviour of managers. Banks with high profitability are less pressured to revenue creation and thus less constrained to engage in risky credit offerings. At the same time, inefficient banks are more likely to experience high levels of problem loans. Poor management can imply weak monitoring for both operating costs and credit quality of customers, which will induce high levels of capital losses. Under this bad management hypothesis advanced by Berger and DeYoung (1997) , managers lack competencies to effectively assess and control risks incurred when lending to new customers. Godlewski (2004) , using the adjusted return on assets ratio (ROA) as a proxy for performance, shows that banks profitability negatively impacts the level of NPLs ratio. However, using a panel of 129 Spain banks during 1993 -2000 , Garcia-Marco and Robles-Fernandez (2007 find that higher levels of return on equity are followed by greater risk in the subsequent periods. They argue that profit-maximizing policies will be accompanied by higher levels of risk:
H3. Bank profitability is negatively associated with NPLs. Salas and Saurina (2002) argue that to enhance the economic development of the country, state-owned banks have more incentives to fund riskier projects and to allocate more favourable credits for small and medium firms. This inadequate risk taking behaviour (compared to the return profile) will lead to a higher level of NPLs. In the same vein, Micco et al. (2004) report that state-owned banks tend to have higher levels of NPLs, due to their weak credit recovery capacity compared to privately owned banks. Others suggest that the interaction between private and state shareholding in the same bank could determine the risk level taken by banks. Hu et al. (2004) argue that unjustified risky behaviour is lower when the two groups check and balance each other. In the opposite, when private and state shareholders collude, especially in societies with little civil disciplines, problem loans will be higher due to risky credit offering. Tian (2000) suggests that under conditions of market imperfection, due to a balancing mechanism between management incentives and bureaucracy forces, a mixed enterprise (joint shareholding of private and state owners) will maximize social surplus. Empirically, Novaes and Werlang (1995) report lower performance for state controlled banks in Brazil and Argentina due to high proportion of problem loans given to government. Micco et al. (2004) , analyze 50,000 financial institutions with different ownership types covering 119 countries. They conclude that NPLs tend to be higher for banks with state ownership than for other groups. This is explained by the development mandate given to state-owned banks in developing economies. Hu et al. (2004) use a panel of Taiwanese banks and find a positive correlation between capital share owned by the state and the level of NPLs. Finally, Garcia-Marco and Robles-Fernandez (2007) investigate the relationship between risk taking and ownership structure. They document that commercial banks (mainly private owned) are more exposed to risk than deposit banks (mainly state owned):
H4. State ownership is positively associated with NPLs.
Foreign ownership has a positive impact on banks' soundness. Levine (1996) suggests that foreign shareholding improves the supply and the quality of financial services, enhances the overall supervisory environment and eases the access to international financial markets. Accordingly, Brealey and Kaplanis (1996) report that the presence of foreign banks may enhance foreign direct investment in the non financial sector. Besides, foreign ownership improves human capital through the presence of foreign managers which bring better skills and technologies, in particular in developing countries (Lensink and Hermes, 2004) . This international expertise will also lead to improve local competencies through training and knowledge transfer. Empirically, Barth et al. (2002) find a negative effect of foreign ownership on NPLs on a cross countries analysis. They highlight that foreign banks raise loan quality in a country and may lead to improve domestic banks credit quality. At the same time, Boubakri et al. (2005) show that foreign participation reduces the level of risk taking amongst banks on a sample of 81 banks from 22 developing countries. Finally, Micco et al. (2004) find that foreign controlled banks are more performant than domestic ones for a panel of emerging countries:
H5. Foreign ownership is negatively associated with NPLs.
2.1.5 Industry concentration. The banking industry concentration can also affect the credit risk taking among banks (Fernandez de Lis et al., 2000) . Two strands JFEP 1,4 of literature are opposed: the competition-fragility view and the alternative competition-stability view.
Under the traditional view, increased bank competition erodes market power, reduces profit margins, and leads to low franchise value that encourages bank risk taking and thus to increase the level of NPLs (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990; Demsetz et al., 1996) . Banks tend to relax restrictions on loans to capture the additional market share. Bad borrowers would get then loans, generating high levels of NPLs. For example, Petersen and Rajan (1995) find that in concentrated banking systems, younger firms (supposed to be of lower quality) are financed by banks in comparison to more competitive markets, where firms use other instruments, leading thus to a higher level of problem loans. At the same time, Breuer (2006) finds a small but a significant positive association between banking industry concentration and NPLs.
Under the alternative competition-stability view, banks increased market power may lead to higher risk exposures. In monopolistic banking markets, lending institutions charge higher interest rates to recover incurred losses on past loans. This will make it harder for low quality firms to repay loans, and results in more moral hazard and adverse selection problems. For instance, Keeley (1990) , based on a sample of American banks over the period [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] , find that Banks with more market power hold more capital relative to assets and they have a lower default risk. Recently, using data from the Central and Eastern European banking sectors over the period 1998 -2005 , Agoraki et al. (2009 , suggest that banks with market power tend to take on lower credit risk and have a lower probability of default. Besides, Fungacova and Weill (2009) H6. Industry concentration is associated with NPLs.
Bank supervision and NPLs
By its nature, the banking sector should be regulated and supervised to ensure the stability of the whole financial system. During the recent decades, the banking regulatory framework has experienced sharp changes. Several reforms regarding banking supervision have been initiated since 1988 (Basel I) and reviewed since then until 2004 (Basel II). The question of how regulation influences the banking stability and soundness remains a source of debate. In previous studies, there is no consensus on what type of regulations and supervisory practices promote bank development, enhance financial stability, and facilitate efficient corporate finance (Barth et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2006b; Shaffer, 2008) . In the remainder of this section, we examine the impact of the regulatory framework on problem loans. We use four variables related to the level of capital requirement, the official supervisory power, the market discipline, and the independence of supervisory authority.
2.2.1 Capital stringency. Regulatory and supervisory bodies emphasize the positive role of capital stringency as a buffer against losses and hence failures (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994) . However, empirical evidence suggests that this is not always the case. Barth et al. (2004) study the relationship between specific regulatory and supervisory practices and banking-sector development, efficiency and fragility. They find that stringent capital requirements are associated with fewer NPLs but are not robustly linked to other banking outcomes. Pasiouras (2008) (Besanko and Kanatas, 1996; Blum, 1999) . For instance, Godlewski (2004) , reports that capital regulation in the banking industry is positively related to excess risk taking. This increased credit risk leads to an increase in the ratio of NPLs. He explains that stringent constraints on capital imply additional pressure on assets returns, which could be done through higher risk taking. H7. Capital stringency is negatively associated with NPLs.
2.2.2 Official supervisory power. Granting broad power to supervisors remains a subject of controversial debates. From a theoretical point of view, increased official supervisory power is beneficial for the development and the stability of the financial system. Barth et al. (2004) argue that, due to market imperfections, official supervision may constitute a better substitute to market failure and contribute to further stabilize the financial system. However, under specific circumstances, such as corrupt environment or lack of democracy and civil discipline, powerful supervision will hinder the performance and the efficiency of the financial system (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Levine, 2003) . Barth et al. (2004) show that broader supervisory power is associated with higher problem loans and may hamper bank development, especially inside closed political systems. Pasiouras et al. (2006) also find evidence for the negative impact of supervisory power and credit ratings:
H8. Official supervisory power is negatively associated with NPLs.
Private monitoring.
Market discipline function, proxied by the private monitoring index, has not received sufficient interest from researchers, although it is one of the pillars of the Basel II accord. Private monitoring promotion is considered to lead to more efficient banking sector, owing to accurate information disclosure (Hay and Shleifer, 1998) and to less corruption of bank officials (Beck et al., 2006b) . Empirically, Barth et al. (2004) report no evidence of a relationship between enhanced information disclosure and other regulatory incentives and banking fragility. Recently, Barth et al. (2006) revisiting the market discipline function, indicate that the positive impact of private monitoring on bank lending relies on the quality and the development of the legal system and the governmental institutions effectiveness. On the other hand, Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2008) find that sounder banks are located in countries where financial data on banks have to be reported regularly and accurately to regulators and market participants:
H9. Private monitoring is negatively associated with NPLs.
Supervisory bodies' independence.
Finally, the independence of supervisory authorities is deemed to have an impact on problem loans. Theoretically, the independence of supervisory authorities is supposed to lead to healthier financial systems, as political interference in monetary policies is shown to have various undesirable consequences. Barth et al. (2006) suggest that the extent to which bank JFEP 1,4
supervisors are politically and economically pressured or influenced, may condition disciplinary actions enforcement on banks. However, many policy makers are still opposed to such independency. They fear that this will lead to create states into states, particularly in developing economies. Hüpkes et al. (2006) advocate the need to draw up accountability on supervision agencies to promote their performance and enhance their legitimacy. Abrams and Taylor (2001) , among others, stress the need to entrust bank supervision to central banks, which are considered to be more independent than banks supervision bodies, especially in emerging countries. Empirically, Donzé (2006) finds supervision independence to be positively associated to sounder banking systems. Klomp and de Haan (2008) considering data for 70 countries, report a negative relationship between central bank independence and financial instability:
H10. Supervisory authorities' independence is negatively associated with NPLs.
Data and methodology

Data
This paper considers aggregated data on NPLs. This choice is motivated by the fact that data on NPLs for individual banks are available only for a very limited number of countries. As noted by Hasan and Wall (2004) , only US banks provide full information on their financial outcomes and particularly on problem loans. They emphasize the challenges that face researchers dealing with NPLs data on other countries. For instance, the Bankscope database, which provides the widest coverage of countries and banking organizations, suffers from representativeness bias. For instance, the data used by Breuer (2006) do not represent the aggregate level of bad loans as published by the IMF, albeit considering only countries providing NPLs data for at least four banks. To our knowledge, except the study by Babihuga (2007) , our paper pioneers the research work investigating the determinants of NPLs at the aggregate level. We use aggregate Financial Soundness Indicators (FSI) data drawn from the IMF (2007), which provides a unique information set for 95 countries during the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . We started our sample selection by considering all the countries available in the IMF (2007). We then excluded 19 countries for which information on NPLs, CAR, return on asset and provisions are missing. We further excluded four countries for which data on financial development are missing in the financial development report. Finally, we excluded 12 countries not included in The World Bank database on regulations and supervisions (Barth et al., 2001 (Barth et al., , 2006 or for which regulatory variables were not available. Table I illustrates these different treatments. The final data set includes 59 countries for which data are available for all variables. This resulted in a data set of 295 country-year observations.
Variables definition
We employ a sample of 59 countries over the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] to investigate bank industry determinants of NPLs and the role of the supervisory framework. The bank industry factors include the one year lagged bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets minus the required minimum capital (Difcar t2 1 ). We think that this measure is more appropriate than using the absolute level of the regulatory capital because it controls for the differences in the regulatory minimum solvency ratio between countries. This category is composed also of the one year lagged loan loss reserves to total loans ratio (Prov t2 1 ), the one year lagged return on assets ratio (ROA t2 1 ), Banking supervision and NPLs the percentage of state-owned banks (State); the percentage of foreign ownership (Forg) and the percentage of assets held by the five largest banks (Conc) as a measure of banking industry concentration. Finally, we use two control variables. First, the lagged real gross domestic product (GDP) growth (GDPgr t2 1 ) is introduced to control for the possible impact of economic conditions on problem loans (Sinkey and Greenawalt, 1991; Anandarajan et al., 2007) . Second, to account for differences in the level of financial development we use a dummy variable (Fin_Dev). Based on the work of Rajan and Zingales (1998) , it is deemed that financial development helps institutions to resolve moral hazard and adverse selection problems and hence contributes to reduce financing costs and to enhance other banking outcomes. Table II provides further details on variables calculations and sources of information.
To study the supervisory and regulatory environment, we use an assortment of indicators from the Barth, Caprio, and Levine database developed on three versions (Surveys I, II, and III established in 1999 , 2001 and published in 2001 . Since this database is available at only three points in time, we used information from Version 2 for the period 2002-2004, and from Version 3 for the period 2005-2006[1] . A growing number of papers use the information contained in this data set to study the impact of bank supervision and regulatory policies on bank performance, stability, and corporate finance (Beck et al., 2003; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2003) .
To test the effect of the regulatory and supervisory factors on problem loans, we include four variables. First, to account for both initial and overall capital stringency, we introduce the Capital regulatory index (Car_index), which is supposed to capture both the overall stringency (amount of capital) and the initial capital stringency (verifiable sources of capital), with higher values indicating higher capital stringency. The second variable is the supervisory power (Pow_sup), which indicates the ability of supervisors to exercise their power and to get involved in banking decisions. Then, to capture the impact of private monitoring on problem loans we use the (Priv_mon), which indicates the degree of information that is released to officials and to the public, the auditing related requirements and whether credit ratings are required. Higher values indicate more private oversight. These first three variables may be seen as reflecting the three pillars of Basel II accord. Finally, the impact of the independence Notes: Where NPLs is the aggregate rate of nonperforming loans; Difcar is the difference between the CAR and the minimum required; Prov is the bank provisions to NPLs; ROA is bank return on assets; State is government-owned bank assets divided by total bank asset; Forg is foreign-owned bank assets divided by total bank; Conc is percentage of assets held by the five largest banks; and GDPgr is the annual real growth rate of GDP 
where NPL is the aggregated NPLs to total loans ratio; Difcar t2 1 , is the one year lagged bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets minus the required minimum capital; Prov t2 1 is the one year lagged loan loss reserves to total loans ratio; ROA t2 1 is the one year lagged ROA; State is the percentage of state-owned banks; Forg is the percentage of foreign ownership; Conc is the percentage of assets held by the five largest banks; GDPgr t2 1 is the one year lagged real GDP growth rate, and Fin_Dev is a measure of the level of country financial development. CAR, loans loss provisions, return on assets, and GDP growth rate are introduced in the model lagged one period to avoid endogeneity. We use a pooled regression approach. Panel data combines both time series and cross-section data. First, it has the advantage to increase the number of observations, degrees of freedom and reduce collinearity among explanatory variables especially when the number of years is low. Second, pooling enables to control for exogenous shocks common to all banks (time effects) and reducing the omitted variable bias (unit effects). However, simple pooled regression may not be well designed to capture relationships between the dependent variable and explanatory variables. This is due to the fact that pooled regression assumes homogenous behavior of endogenous variable for all individuals in the sample (same intercept and same slopes). This is not obviously the case for the variable NPLs, as it varies considerably between countries and over years. Several alternative estimation methods are more suitable for panel data (fixed and random effects). Using the Hausman test, the fixed effect specification is preferred. However, the use of fixed effects specification raises two concerns. First, as noted by Haas and Lelyveld (2006) , unit dummies are known to eliminate too much cross-sectional variance. Second, the inclusion of units dummies eliminates de facto time invariant exogenous variables and does not properly capture the impact of quasi time invariant variables (Beck, 2005) . With regard to error structure, the fixed effects specification assumes that the error terms have a constant variance over time and are serially uncorrelated. Another possible solution would have been to include country-specific dummies to capture the fixed effects. This would have considerably reduced the degrees of freedom (Haas and Lelyveld, 2006) . Moreover, the country-specific effect is captured through the inclusion of macroeconomic and structural variables related to the financial sector. To further control for possible differences between countries, we introduced a dummy variable for the level of financial development. Besides, we are rather interested in making inferences with respect to population characteristics than in estimating the country-specific effect.
We also turned to test the heteroskedasticity and the autocorrelation problems. Contemporaneous correlations (i.e. the errors across cross-sectional units are correlated Banking supervision and NPLs due to common shocks in a given time period), panel heteroskedasticity (i.e. the error variance differs across cross-sectional units due to characteristics unique to the units), and serial correlation (i.e. the errors within units are temporally correlated) characterize our data structure. Feasible generalized last squares (FGLS) specification can be used after controlling for the heteroskedasticity and the autocorrelation problems. However, Beck and Katz (1995, 1996) , advocate the use of the panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) method to improve inferences by taking into account the complexity of the error process. Based on Monte Carlo studies, Beck and Katz (1995, 1996) demonstrate that PCSE produces more reliable standard errors than FGLS method. Given the features of our data we use the PCSE method to estimate our models. Table V shows the empirical results of our regressions. Model 1 presents results for the baseline model. Models 2 to 5 exhibit results for the supervision factors. The estimated coefficients on the banking industry variables appears to be robust to the specification used. The regressions show evidence for a negative impact of the variable (DifCar) on the credit risk exposure. This indicates that the regulatory capital serves as an indicator of the financial risk exposure of the whole banking system. These results suggest that the CAR might be used as a regulatory device to mitigate banks excessive risk taking (Fries et al., 2002; Sinkey and Greenawalt, 1991) . In conclusion, it appears that the first pillar of Basel II does not have any statistically significant impact on NPLs.
Empirical results
We find also a significant and negative relationship between NPLs and lagged loan loss provisions rate (Prov). Countries with higher rates of problem loans exhibit lower level of provisions rates and vice versa. This contradicts the theoretical assertion, which predicts the use of provisions as a risk control tool and therefore to be positively related to problem loans. On the other hand, countries with low rates of NPLs adopt a better provisioning policy (higher loan loss provisions). This may reflect the general attitude toward risk in the banking industry of each country. In countries where risk control is more effective and considered as an essential component of banks strategy, loan loss provisions are used, among other means, to hedge future exposures to credit risk. From a regulatory body point view, it is thus necessary to promote strong incentives which aim to improve banks provisioning efforts.
However, we do not find any evidence for the association between NPLs and lagged ROA. We give the following explanations to this surprising result. First, it is possible that the relation between performance and risk taking do not hold at the aggregate level while it holds at the bank firm level. In fact, the overall performance of the banking system may hide severe variations in the individual performance of banks, while the aggregate level of NPLs exhibit lesser variation. Second, the absence of any relation between performance and NPLs could be due to the inclusion in the sample of countries with different level of performance. In fact, while in developing economies, revenue creations pressures play a central role in shaping lending activities of banks, those experiencing such pressures in developed countries do not necessarily embark in riskier lending offerings (in an aggregate level), as they may turn to other non credit revenues to respond to the revenue creation pressures.
The estimate coefficients on state property (State) are positive and significant, which indicates that state-ownership rises the level of problem loans. This could 59 (295) 59 (295) 59 (295) 59 (295) 59 (295) Notes: Significance at * 10, * * 5, and * * * 1 percent levels, respectively; method estimation is panel corrected standard errors; where Difcar is the difference between the CAR and the minimum required; Prov is the bank provisions to NPLs; ROA is bank return on assets; State is government-owned bank assets divided by total bank asset; Forg is foreign-owned bank assets divided by total bank asset; Cone is percentage of assets held by the five largest banks; GDPgr is the annual real growth rate of GDP; Devfin is a dummy variable that takes 1 for financial developed countries and 0 otherwise; Pow_sup is the official supervisory power; Priv_mon is the private monitoring index; Indep is the independence of supervisory authority; and Car_index is the capital regulatory index Levine (1996) and Barth et al. (2002) who highlight the positive impact of foreign shareholding on financial outcomes. Another plausible explanation for this result is that banks with foreign participation are subject to more stringent control due to a more restrictive regulatory framework (from their home regulatory authorities) than domestic banks, which are supposed to have weaker institutions (especially when foreign ownership is directed from developed to developing or emerging countries). Furthermore, as noted by Lensink and Hermes (2004) , foreign ownership contributes to improve human capital and management efficiency as it brings better skills, technologies, and risk management practices, in particular in developing countries. For policy makers, our findings suggest that increased participation by foreign banks improves financial stability, and hence the efficiency of the banking sector. However, the recent banking crisis raised concerns about the harmful side effects of such entry.
Finally, we find a negative relationship between bank concentration and NPLs. This result suggests that in a concentrated banking market, risky borrowers cannot easily access to credit from large banks which monopolize the banking sector (Fernandez de Lis et al., 2000) . On the other hand, in a non-concentrated market, increased competition among lenders leads banks to relax the credit constraints which thus rises loans defaults occurrence. Our findings give hence evidence to the "competition-fragility" view, which highlights the benefits of bank concentration (Allen and Gale, 2004) . We then contribute to the controversial debate over the impact of banking concentration on financial stability.
The estimated coefficient for the lagged growth rate is not significant, indicating that economic conditions is not related to problem loans. This result is contradictory to both theoretical prediction and common wisdom, which relate economic cycle to credit quality of borrowers (Sinkey and Greenawalt, 1991; Salas and Saurina, 2002) . However, we document that the level of problem loans is higher in less financially developed economies.
We now turn to the investigation of the impact of the regulatory environment on problem loans (Table V) . For all the specifications used, the main relations remain the same for all the variables of the basic model, indicating the robustness of our previous results. However, all regulatory variables introduced are not significant. These findings suggest that he regulatory channel is not the optimal device to reduce risk taking and hence problem loans. The ineffectiveness of all the statutory powers reported in our study corroborates the growing literature on the absence of any relationship between supervisory regulation and banking outcomes.
To further investigate the extent of our results, we divide the sample into two groups: developed and developing countries. Despite the fact that we control for differences across countries and across time, countries which are more developed are likely to have mature markets and institutions which can influence NPLs. We re-estimate the different models for the two subsamples. The results are reported in Table VI. 25 (125) 25 (125) 25 (125) 25 (125) Subsample of developed countries 34 (170) 34 (170) 34 (170) 34 (170) Notes: Significance at * 10, * * 5, and * * * 1 percent levels, respectively; method estimation is panel corrected standard errors; where Difcar is the difference between the CAR and the minimum required; Prov is the bank provisions to NPLs; ROA is bank return on assets; State is government-owned bank assets divided by total bank asset; Forg is foreignowned bank assets divided by total bank asset; Conc is percentage of assets held by the five largest banks; GDPgr is the annual real growth rate of GDP; Dev_fin is a dummy variable that takes 1 for financial developed countries and 0 otherwise; Pow_sup is the official supervisory power; Priv_mon is the private monitoring index; Indep is the independence of supervisory authority; and Car_index is the capital regulatory index The results are different for the two subsamples regarding foreign participation. In developing countries, foreign ownership contributes to the reduction of NPLs. This result corroborates our previous findings. On the contrary, foreign participation worsens the credit quality of banks in developed countries. Owing to similarities in human capital efficiency and to a more homogenous regulatory framework, foreign and domestic banks do not exhibit substantial differences in the assessment of credit quality of borrowers. However, foreign banks as they seek to conquest local market shares may engage in riskier activities and thus are exposed to greater risk compared to domestic firms. With regard to bank performance, the estimated coefficient entered significantly only for developed countries panel. This indicates that risk taking is increased in banking systems exhibiting high levels of performance. Our results corroborates those of Garcia-Marco and Robles-Fernandez (2007) who argue that profit-maximizing policies are usually accompanied by higher levels of risk.
Regarding economic conditions, the estimated coefficient for the lagged growth rate enters negatively and significantly indicating that economic conditions contribute to explain problem loans. Economic booms improve borrowers credit quality and facilitate repayments particularly in developing countries.
On the other hand, differences are found between countries as regard to the effect of supervisory variables on financial system stability when we split the sample into developing and developed countries. In referring to the group of developing countries, regulatory variables do not serve to control credit risk. Moreover, public supervision power is reported to increase problem loans. This indicates that in developing countries granting more power to supervisory bodies is counterproductive. We contend that in immature markets, where civil discipline is low, corruption is high, and institutions are weak, the regulatory channel is not the optimal device to reduce risk taking and hence problem loans. For the developed countries panel, only capital adequacy stringency and independence of supervisory authority enters significantly. In contrast, market discipline (private monitoring) shows no significant association with the level of problem loans. This may be explained by the fact that in developed countries the variable Priv_mon exhibits no significant variability across countries and thus does not contribute to discriminate differences in NPLs.
However, as noted by several authors, the inefficacy of regulatory devices may be due to the fact that the measures used for regulatory variables only "relate to statutory powers" and not to the effective power. Second, the efficacy of regulatory reforms depends mainly on the quality and the effectiveness of the political and social institutions. The next section seeks to expose and to explain the different aspects related to this issue. Hafeez (2003) stresses out that political institutions, corruption, rule of law and protection of property rights play a central role in the efficacy of regulatory reforms. As noted by Barth et al. (2006) , strengthening official supervision will enhance the overall financial development. The previous studies dealing with banking regulation do not, however, consider whether the effective implementation of those regulations play any role in the efficacy of such policies. To further investigate the impact of regulatory and supervisory framework on problem loans, we introduced three interactions to account for possible effect of the political and legal environment JFEP 1,4 on the effectiveness of regulation. We hence consider three factors: the level of corruption, the degree of democracy, and the rule of law. Barth et al. (2006) highlight that conventional official regulation and supervision does not improve banking outcomes, especially in countries with weak political institutions. They emphasize that empowering official supervision and regulation will lead to an increase in corrupt bank lending. Anderson (2004) supports this view. He finds that conventional government regulation is more likely to be counterproductive as regulators are less competent than bankers and are exposed to corruption and to political pressure. They end up by serving the interest of the banking industry and pressure groups either than serving the public interest. Corruption could also be present in privately owned banks especially in societies with little democratic traditions and civil discipline (Finkel et al., 2000; Johnson and Wilson, 2000) . In such societies, decision makers are exposed to informal connections and other pressures from groups seeking for unjustified or illegal economic rents. The level of corruption is accounted for by the corruption perception index (CPI) which ranges from ten (squeaky clean) to zero (highly corrupt). To introduce the interactions terms, we constructed a dummy variable taking 1 for countries with CPI value less than 5 and 0 otherwise.
Discussion: explaining the ineffectiveness of regulatory devices
On the other hand, Barth et al. (2004) stress out that official supervision may be harmful to the development of the banking sector in countries with less political openness. Barth et al. (2006) suggest taking into account the level of democracy in the country when evaluating the impact of supervisory independence on banking sector outcomes. According to Sobel (2003) , the level of democracy which depends on the extent of political and civil freedom, will shape regulatory vulnerability to political and other groups pressures. In fact, democratic governments through countervailing forces and institutions are constrained to pursue public interest (Tsebelis, 1995; Eichengreen, 1998) . However, the extent to which democracy and political participation shape economic outcomes is somewhat controversial. Wittman (1995) , Pastor and Sung (1995) and Leblang (1997) argument that enhanced democracy precludes economic growth. Helliwell (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) suggest that democracy is negatively linked to economic outcomes. Finally, Keech (1995) and Clague et al. (1996) find mixed results. The level of democracy is accounted for by the democracy index which ranges between 0 (authoritarian regime) and 10 (full democracy). For the purpose of our study, we constructed a dummy variable taking 1 for countries with democracy index value superior to 6 (democratic countries) and 0 otherwise (The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy, 2007) .
Finally, the extent to which contracts and laws are enforced in the country may impact the efficacy of the implementation of both existing and newly implemented regulations. This is particularly true as the global economy is moving toward market-based systems. To this extent, Carothers (1998) notes that the rule of law is central to both economic development and democracy. Besides, international institutions are devoting considerable resources to strengthen legal institutions in several countries. To account for the level of law enforcement, we use the rule of law index developed by Kaufmann et al. (2008) . It ranges between 2 2.5 (worst execution of laws) and 2.5 (best enforcement). We introduce a dummy variable that takes 1 for countries with values of rule of law index superior to the median and 0 otherwise.
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In contrast with Barth et al. (2006) , who consider only the impact of these variables to examine their impact on bank crisis and other financial outcomes, we investigate this channel through the inclusion of interaction terms between the three political and business environment variables and each of the regulatory and supervision variables.
Results for the full model including each of the supervisory and regulatory variables together with the interaction terms are reported in Tables VII-IX. The main relations remain the same for all the variables of the basic model (bank industry variables), indicating the robustness of our previous results.
Table VII presents regression results after controlling for the level of corruption. In countries with little corruption, only the level of independence of the supervision authority is reported to reduce the level of NPLs. The other three regulatory devices considered in our study have no significant impact on the level of problem loans. In this regard, we consider our results contradictory to those of Barth et al. (2004 Barth et al. ( , 2006 . In fact, they conclude for the superiority of the self-regulated systems (private interest view) based on the significance of the relationship between banking outcomes and the market discipline after controlling for the degree of corruption. Our results add inconsistency to this point of view which is yet confirmed by the 2008 crisis. At the opposite, in corrupt systems the strength and the empowerment of regulation and official supervision seem to be counterproductive. All the interaction terms are significantly positive. Again, we argue that in corrupt banking markets, where civil discipline is low and institutions are weak, the regulatory channel is not the optimal device to reduce risk taking and hence problem loans. Table VIII exhibits the results of regressions after taking into account the level of democracy of a country. First, we find that the stringency of regulatory capital, official supervisory power and the independence of supervisory authority positively impact lending activities and hence reduces the level of problem loans in politically opened countries. In contrast, there is no support for the view that private monitoring boosts financial stability. We consider our findings as an evidence (albeit not strong) against the superiority of the private interest view over the public interest view. Second, for countries with little democratic roots, the results show no significant impact of regulatory traits on the level of problem loans. Table IX reports the results for the regression using the interaction between regulatory variables and the rule of law. The results show clearly that in countries where laws are better enforced, regulatory devices seem to have a positive impact on the quality of loans. In contrast, in countries with weak rule of law, the stringency of regulatory capital and private monitoring have an adverse impact on problem loans and lending activities. There is however no support for any impact of the other two regulatory traits.
Our empirical results broadly corroborates the growing number of studies which suggest that there is no consensus as to what constitutes good regulation and supervision, or how specific regulations influence the performance and the stability of the banking sector (Barth et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2006b; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2008; Shaffer, 2008) . Our results stress further the inefficacy of regulations based on market discipline and indirect monitoring, especially in immature markets. The findings highlight that prior to regulation reforms, international institutions have to focus on enhancing market transparency, law enforcement, promoting healthy political institutions, and increasing transparency and accountability. 59 (295) 59 (295) 59 (295) 59 (295) Notes: Significance at * 10, * * 5, and * * * 1 percent levels, respectively; method estimation is panel corrected standard errors; where Difcar is the difference between the CAR and the minimum required; Prov is the bank provisions to NPLs; ROA is bank return on assets; State is government-owned bank assets divided by total bank asset; Forg is foreign -owned bank assets divided by total bank asset; Cone is percentage of assets held by the five largest banks; GDPgr is the annual real growth rate of GDP; Devfin is a dummy variable that takes 1 for financial developed countries and 0 otherwise, CPI is a dummy variable taking 1 for countries with score corruption value inferior to 5 and 0 otherwise Pow_sup is the official supervisory power; Priv_ mon is the private monitoring index; Indep is the Independence of supervisory authority; and Car_index is the capital regulatory index 59 (295) 59 (295) 59 (295) 59 (295) Notes: Significance at * 10, * * 5, and * * * 1 percent levels, respectively; method estimation is panel corrected standard errors; where Difcar is the difference between the CAR and the minimum required; Prov is the bank provisions to NPLs; ROA is bank return on assets; State is government-owned bank assets divided by total bank asset; Forg is foreign-owned bank assets divided by total bank asset; Cone is percentage of assets held by the five largest banks; GDPgr is the annual real growth rate of GDP; Devfin is a dummy variable that takes 1 for financial developed countries and 0 otherwise; Democ is a dummy variable that takes 1 for democratic countries and 0 otherwise, Pow_sup is the official supervisory power; Priv_mon is the private monitoring index; Indep is the Independence of supervisory authority; and Car_index is the capital regulatory index 59 (295) 59 (295) 59 (295) 59 (295) Notes: Significance at * 10, * * 5, and * * * 1 percent levels, respectively; method estimation is panel corrected standard errors; where Difcar is the difference between the CAR and the minimum required; Prov is the bank provisions to NPLs; ROA is bank return on assets; State is government-owned bank assets divided by total bank asset; Forg is foreign-owned bank assets divided by total bank; Cone is percentage of assets held by the five largest banks; GDPgr is the annual real growth rate of GDP; Devfin is a dummy variable that takes 1 for financial developed countries and 0 otherwise; Rlaw is the rule of law index; Pow_sup is the official supervisory power; Priv_mon is the private monitoring index; Indep is the Independence of supervisory authority; and Car_index is the capital regulatory index 
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an empirical framework to investigate the bank industry factors and supervisory determinants of NPLs on a cross-country basis. First, we use specific variables that capture many of the factors suggested by the theory and highlighted by case studies. Besides, to investigate the role of the regulatory framework on credit risk outcomes, we introduce variables on banks supervision. Finally, to assess the impact of the effective implementation of those regulations, we experiment interactions of three institutional variables (corruption, democracy, and rule of law) with each of the supervision proxies. In contrast with previous work, we include interaction terms between political and business environment variables and each of the supervision variables to investigate their impact on banks credit exposures.
Using aggregate data on a panel of 59 countries over the period 2002-2006 and robust econometric techniques, we find strong evidence on the association between NPLs and bank specific variables. Particularly, higher CARs and higher provisions ratios are negatively associated with the level of problem loans. These results remain robust even when we split the sample into developing and developed countries. We also report a desirable impact of private ownership, foreign participation, and bank concentration on the stability of the bank sector. However, foreign entry is reported to deteriorate the credit exposure of financial institutions in developed countries. We contend that due to aggressive commercial strategies when penetrating domestic markets, foreign banks, and investors tend to take on excessive risks compared to local banks. Among the control variables, only financial development explains the level of NPLs. However, economic conditions do not significantly impact bank credit outcomes in developed countries. Economic cycles seem only matter in developing economies.
Finally, we examine the extent to which supervisory framework has a positive impact on credit risk exposures. Our primarily results indicate no support for any relation between official supervision and problem loans. This adds to the growing evidence against the effectiveness of such devices.
However, our results suffer from the fact that the measures used only relate to statutory powers. Thus, they do not address the issue of the effective implementation of supervisory reforms. To investigate this channel, we introduce three interactions using the level of corruption, the degree of political openness, and the rule of law. All of these variables are supposed to have an impact on the efficacy of regulation. Our findings do not support the view that market discipline (albeit not strongly) leads to better economic outcomes and to reduce the level of problem loans. Our contention is drawn upon the absence of any association between the variable private monitoring and the level of problem loans. Indeed, using various specifications (interactions terms and subsamples of developed and developing countries) the coefficients never entered significantly.
Moreover, all regulatory devices either exert a counterproductive impact on problem loans or do not significantly enhance credit risk exposures for countries with weak institutions, corrupt business environment, and little democracy. These findings are confirmed by the results for the developing countries panel. Moreover, the coefficient estimate on the variable supervisory power indicates a positive association with the level of NPLs. Our results suggest that granting increased power to central bankers is detrimental for financial stability in developing economies.
Our results have the following policy implications. First, higher CARs results in less credit exposures. Second, more developed financial systems experience improved stability. Hence, international regulators should continue their efforts to enhance financial development. Third, private ownership and foreign participation insure healthier financial systems in less developing economies. Although we do not show evidence for causality, our results suggest that foreign participation plays an important role in reducing credit exposure of financial institutions. However, in developed countries foreign entry led to more problem loans. Finally, to reduce credit risk exposure in countries with weak institutions, the effective way to do it is through enhancing the legal system, strengthening institutions, and increasing transparency and democracy. Notes: Where NPL is the aggregate rate of nonperforming loans; Difcar is the difference between the CAR and the minimum required; Prov is the bank provisions to NPLs; ROA is bank return on assets; State is government-owned bank assets divided by total bank asset; Forg is foreignowned bank assets divided by total bank; Conc is percentage of assets held by the five largest banks; and GDPgr is the annual real growth rate of GDP Table AI . Notes: Where NPLs is the aggregate rate of banks nonperforming loans; Difcar is the difference between the CAR and the minimum required; Prov is the bank provisions to NPLs; ROA is bank return on assets; State is government-owned bank assets divided by total, bank asset; Forg is foreignowned bank assets divided by total bank; Conc is percentage of assets held by the five largest banks; GDPgr is the annual real growth rate of GDP; Pow_sup is the official supervisory power; Priv_mon is the private monitoring index; Indep is the independence of supervisory authority; and Car_ index is the capital regulatory index 
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